Kant does not have a single genus term for 'emotion'. Maria Borges's book belongs to a tradition of Kant scholarship that eschews the well-worn caricature - aiming to do so by drawing attention to the wide-ranging significance of emotion in Kant's philosophy. Moreover, when we give Kant's later works in moral philosophy their due, we are much less likely to think of Kantian ethics as a cold and bloodless affair.

Indeed, when we look to Kant's treatment of some of these other dimensions of human life - such as his view of aesthetic judgment, and his pioneering work in anthropology - we find he has a considerable amount to say about the wide range of human emotion. The caricature, of course, does not rule out the possibility of a place for emotion in the parts of human life that might be thought to fall outside the immediate scope of morality. According to a well-worn caricature, Immanuel Kant took the business of morality to be a matter for the pure rational will, and consequently did not accord much room for emotion in a morally good life.

Lack of emotion